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COMMENTS
Prior Restraints on Motion Pictures
When the decision in the Burstyn Case' was rendered, many felt that the
death knell had been sounded for motion picture censorship statutes. Perhaps
for many censorship statutes the case was fatal, certainly for the New York2 and
Ohio3 statutes, but not for the reason that presents itself upon first reading.' The
Burstyn Case did not say categorically, nor even intimate, that each and every
prior restraint upon motion pictures is an abridgment of the First Amendment
guarantee (and also the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee) of free speech and
free press. On the contrary, the Supreme Court purposely left open the question as
to whether or not a "clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the
showing of obscene films" would be constitutional.5 The case can merely be
cited for the proposition that motion pictures are within the protection of the
First Amendment-thus overruling Mutual Film v. Industrial Commission,6 and,
secondly, that the New York statute does not provide a sufficient criteria for
determining what films come within the purview of the statute.
The Burstyn Case affords motion pictures the same protection given to other
media of communication. In order to understand what protection motion pictures
enjoy, it is necessary, therefore, to determine what freedom the press and other
speech enjoys. It is not sufficient, however, merely to evaluate motion pictures on
the same basis as other modes of expression. Motion pictures are a unique media
which present not only all the old problems of free speech and press, but also
new problems of their own.
It is not the contention of the writer that because motion pictures are a more
effective media than newspapers, radio, and other means of communication, that
they do not come within the periphery of the free speech and press guarantee. To
decide that movies are protected by the First Amendment does not, however de-
termine the question of precisely what restrictions are permissible.T It is the
IBurstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952).
2 McKINNEY'S N. Y. LAws, 1947, EDUCATIoN LAw § 122: "The director of the (mo-
tion picture) division (of the education department) or, when authorized by the regents, the
officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion pic-
ture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof
is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacriligious, or is of such a character that its
exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor."
8OHIo GENERAL CODE § 154-47b: (BALDWIN'S OHIo REVIsED CODE (1953)
§ 3305.04): "Only such films as are in the judgment and discretion of the department of
education of a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and
approved by such department."
4Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952); State v. Smith, 108 N. E. 2d 582 (Ohio
1952); Superior Films, Inc. v. Ohio, & Commercial Pictures Corp. v. New York, both
decided January 18, 1954, 22 LW 3193.
529 N. D. Lawyer 27 (1954).
6 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 330 (1915).
7 Burstyn v. Wilson, supra note 1 at 503, "Nor does it follow that motion pictures
are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of
expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems."
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purpose of this article, therefore, to attempt to reach a conclusion as to the
extent that prior restraints may be placed upon motion pictures.
Once any speech is determined to be within the protection afforded by the
Constitution, the degree of control permitted within this protective framework
will vary according to the characteristics of the particular media. Thus, re-
strictions against sound trucks must be related to the raucousness of the dis-
turbance.s In cases of speech making and parades, the restraint must be in re-
lation to traffic congestion and the time, place, and manner of expression. °
Similarly, in most states books and newspapers are subject to the same obscenity
statutes, but the question of obscenity may be judged differently even as to these
two types of publications.10 In Kovacs v. Cooper,1 Mr. Justice Frankfurter ob-
served in his concurring opinion that "movies have created problems not pre-
sented by the circulation of books, pamphlets, or newspapers, and so the movies
have been constitutionally regulated." The characteristics of the motion picture
media justifies a greater degree of control within the scope of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and press. The unique facility of movies for dramatic
presentation through the use of sound, light, and even of the third dimension,
makes motion pictures a powerful vehicle for influencing conduct and behavior.
In Radio Corporation of America v. United States,12 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said:
Man forgets at terrible cost that the environment in which an event is placed
may powerfully determine its effect. Disclosure conveyed by the limitation
and power of the camera does not convey the same things to the minds as
disclosure made by the limitations and of pen or voice. The range of
presentation, the opportunities for distortion, the impact of reason, the effect
on the looker-on as against the reader-hearer, vary; and the difference
may be vital. Judgment may be confused instead of enlightened. Feeling
may be agitated, not guided; reason deflected, not enlisted. Reason--the
deliberative process-has its own requirement, met by one method and
frustrated by another.
War Department experiments have shown that attitude changes and impressions
are actually magnified with the passage of time even though the factual material
presented in motion pictures had been forgotten.' s The power of motion pictures
in the formation of opinion has been demonstrated by measuring the effects of
specific films on the attitudes of audiences. It was shown that while a single
showing may not significantly affect the attitude of an individual or group,
nevertheless, a continued exposure to such type of films will cause a change.' 4
The propensity of motion pictures as a media of instruction and influence is best
illustrated by the widespread adoption of films in such fields as education. re-
8 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949).9 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
10 See 60 Yale Law Journal 696. 709, note 31 (1951).
21 Id. note 8 at 96.
12341 U. S. 412, 425-6 (1951).
23 KLAPPER, EFFECTS OF MASS MEDIA, IV-8-IV-20 (1950).
14 CHARTERS, "Motion Pictures and Youth," READER IN PUBLIC OPINION AND COM-
MUNICATION (Berelson & Janowitz ed. 1950), 397.
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ligion, industry, the armed forces, and government propaganda.1 5 Not only are
motion pictures a powerful force, but they have the dual characteristic of being
able to teach, as well as inform and entertain. As stated by Mr. Samuel Goldwyn,
a leader in the industry, the two jobs of the screen are "to entertain and to edu-
cate", and that pictures "teach when they are pretending not to."' 6
Thus, it is apparent that even though motion pictures are merely another
form of speech that is protected by the First Amendment, such protection not
only must be evaluated in the light of the protection given to radio, newspapers,
and other publications, but also must take into consideration the unique qualities
of motion pictures.
Although the First Amendment is couched in unequivocal terms, neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that freedom of speech and press is
not absolute. These freedoms must be counterbalanced against the public interest,
that is, the welfare, safety, and morals of the community. Accordingly, the cases
are replete with the admonition that "the protection even as to previous restraints
is not absolute."' 7 Perhaps the best illustration of instances where the right to
speak has been validly limited by imposition of prior restraints is where the
speech restrained was inimicable to public safety, peace, and order.
Speech advocating the overthrow of the government through use of force
and violence does not come within safeguards of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.18 The Schenck Case enunciated the classic "clear and present danger"
test whereby the question in every such case is whether "the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature that they will bring about evils that
the legislature has a right to prevent."' 9 The "clear and present danger" doctrine
was the working criteria in these types of cases until reformulated into the "dear
and probable danger" doctrine in the case of Dennis v. United States.20 In that
case, Mr. Justice Vinson accepted the new formula of Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Dennis,2" when he stated:
In each case courts may ask whether the gravity of the "evil" discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger. We have purposely substituted "improbability" for
"remoteness", because that must be the right interpretation ...
Judge Hand further enunciated that "it would be wholly irrational to condone
evils which we should prevent if they were immediate; that could be reconciled
only by indifference to those who came after us." 22 Mr. Justice Vinson added,
15 60 Yale Law Journal 696, 708 (1951). See also JACOB, TIE RISE OF THE AMERI-
CAN FILMS 538, 539; (1939); DOOB, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 501, 504
(1949).
16N. Y. Times Magazine, April 22, 1945, p. 12.
'
1 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
18Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652
(1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927); Dennis v. U. S., 341 U. S. 494
(1952).
19 Schenck v. U. S., supra note 18 at p. 52.
20 341 U. S. 494 (1950).
21183 F. 2d 201, 212 (1950).
22Id. at 212.
"If the ingredients of reaction are present, we cannot bind the government to
wait until the catalyst is added."
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It is no longer open to question that in such instances a previous restraint
can be validly imposed upon this type of speech. Obscenity, hindrance of the
war effort, incitement to crime, and dangers to the welfare of the community
are other instances which justify prior restraints upon speech and press.24 Nor
is a state powerless to prevent a breach of the peace when the bounds of argument
or persuasion are exceeded and there is incitment to riot.25 The Supreme Court
has sanctioned prior restraints in a variety of areas affected by the First Amend-
ment, for example, for the prevention of loud and raucous speeches emanating
from sound trucks,26 upon distribution of literature by minors,27 and by restricting
parades because of the danger of traffic congestion.2
The Supreme Court was first confronted with the question of motion pictures
and the guarantees of the First Amendment in Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Indus-
trial Commission.29 In that case, the Court held that the exhibition of moving
pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit like other
spectacles and not to be regarded as part of the press of the country or as organs
of public opinion within the meaning of freedom of speech.
The first inroad upon this holding, as far as the Supreme Court decisions are
concerned, was not made until some thirty years later in the case of United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 0 By way of dictum, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote that
"we have no doubt that moving pictures like newspapers and radio are included
in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."31
It was the Burstyn Case that delivered the final blow to the decision in the
Mutual Film case:8 2
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that expression by means of motion
pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent that language in the
opinion in Mutual Films Corp. v. Industrial Commission, supra, is out of
harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it.s8
This, then, was the extent to which the Burstyn Case went, that is, motion pic-
tures were placed squarely within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
28 Dennis v. U. S., 341 U. S. 494, 511 (1950).
24See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931): "No one would question but that
a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication
of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar
grounds, the primary requirement of decency may be enforced against obscene publication.25Feiner v. N. Y., 340 U. S. 315 (1951). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
305 U. S. 568 (1942).26 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1948).
27Massachusetts v. Prince, 321 U. S. 158 (1944).2 8 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1940).
29 236 U. S. 230 (1915).
80334 U. S. 131 (1948).
a' Id. at 166.
82 Note 29 supra.
83 Note 1 supra at 502.
ments. However, as pointed out previously, the ultimate decision rested upon
the determination that the New York statute's sole standard, or lack of one, for
prohibiting sacrilegious films was not definite enough. The question of the con-
stitutionality of a well drawn statute requiring censorship of all movies was left
open. It is not unreasonable, therefore, and perhaps even compelling, to conclude
that motion pictures are not given greater protection than is given to other
media of communication, if even that much, and that all the restraints that may
validly be placed on other forms of speech and press applies equally to motion
pictures.
A number of cases have seized upon the principal holding of the Burstyn
Case and have struck down statutes for being vague, indefinite, and uncertain.8 4
In Gelling v. Texas,35 the Supreme Court handed down a per curiam decision
based on the holding in the Burstyn Case invalidating an ordinance of the city
of Marshal, Texas. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment of re-
versal, stated that an ordinance which permits a Board of Censors to deny an
exhibitor's license to any motion picture which in the opinion of the Board is
"prejudicial to the best interests of the people of the said city," offends the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the score of indefiniteness.
In Superior Films, Inc. v. Ohio and Commercial Pictures v. New York,"0 the
U. S. Supreme Court overturned two decisions of state courts on the basis of the
Burstyn Case. In the Superior Films Case the Supreme Court of Ohio 7 held that
the statutory criteria that films submitted for exhibition in the State of Ohio be of
a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character, is sufficiently dear,
definite, and comprehensive.38 In the Commercial Pictures Case, the Court of
Appeals of New York8 9 held that a statute providing that a motion picture shall
not be licensed if it is immoral or is of such a character that its exhibition will
tend to corrupt morals, supplies a sufficiently definite standard. As mentioned
above, the U. S. Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, reversed both cases and
held that the statutes in question denied to the parties due process of law because
the statutes lacked certainty. Mr. Justice Douglas, however, in a concurring
opinion in which Mr. Justice Jackson agreed, stated that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments are clear and that "no law" means "no law", and that under
no circumstances may censorship be sanctioned.
As pointed out earlier, however, there are numerous cases holding that
freedom of speech and press is not absolute and that a prior restraint may be
imposed only under certain grave circumstances.40 Of course, the State or Federal
84 Note 4 supra.
95 343 U. S. 960 (1952).
"Decided together January 18, 1954, 22 LW 3193.
1 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N. E. 2d 311 (1953).
"s Note 3 supra.
89305 N. Y. 336, 113 N. E. 2d 502 (1953).
40 Note 18 supra; see also Note 24 supra.
Government has the onerous burden of demonstrating such an exceptional case
in order to justify any previous restraint.4
The question in every case is not whether all prior restraints are bad or
whether speech and press is permitted to roam unbridled. The answer to the
problem of prior restraints lies, however, somewhere in between. To condemn
each and every form of restraint as dictatorial and antithetical to democratic
government is simply to ignore history. The First Amendment's history abounds
with decisions to the contrary. The fact that the restraint as to motion pictures
takes the form of censorship does not render all the past First Amendment de-
cisions inapplicable. Motion pictures are peculiarly adapted to this form of regu-
lation. "Preliminary inspection, cutting, and licensing on higher government
levels, state-wide, is better than hit-or-miss local criminal prosecution of local
police officers.'4 2 Censorship is not an isolated or a recent innovation. Censorship
statutes have been in operation over some thirty years in numerous states.48
In addition, some of the larger cities in half the states of the Union require prior
approval from a municipal censorship board before a film can be shown.4
The Burstyn Case has been most instrumental in keeping in check any over-
stepping of the bounds of censorship. All censorship should be suspect, and any
attempt under the guise of the police power to infringe upon the fundamental
right of freedom of speech and press should be thoroughly scrutinized and per-
mitted only in instances where a substantive evil would result. All censorship
statutes should be clear and provide a definite standard or criteria as to just
what types of motion pictures come within the framework of the statute. As
pointed out in the Burstyn Case, and cases thereunder, statutes which leave the
entire matter to the opinion of the board of censors, and statutes which require
the films to be "harmless", "educational", and not "sacrilegious", leaves too much
to the discretion of the censoring board. However, neither must the requirement
of definiteness be carried to ludicrous extremes and require the statute to spell
out in detail each and every situation that is to come within the purview of the
statute. When an attempt is made to avoid the terms of the statute and the
statute is being dissected, it is easy to be exacting and meticulous as to its terms.
The task therefore, is to continue to guarantee and protect the cherished
freedoms of the First Amendment, but with the valid limitations sanctioned in
the past. It is not denied that unrestrained censorship could be but the first step
41 Burstyn v. Wilson, supra note 1.
4229 N. D. Lawyer 27, 31 (1953).4 8 See Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. c. 51, c. 74, art. 22 (1949); Md. Ann. Code Gen.
Laws, art. 66A (Flack 1939); N. Y. Ed. Law, art. 3, §§ 120-132 (Baldwin Dec. Supp.
1948); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 154-47 (Page Supp. 1950); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, c. 2
(Purdon Supp. 1950); Va. Code Ann. tit. 2-98 to 2-116 (1950); La. Rev. Stat. tit. 4,
§ 301-307 (1950). See also Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 272, § 232 (1933).
44Ala., Ark., Calif., Conn., Fla., Ill., Mass., Michigan, Minn., Mo., Neb., N. J., Okla.,
Ore., R. I., Tenn., Texas, Wash., and Wisc. See 60 Yale Law Journal 696, note 2
(1951).
to outright suppression. However, purveyors of filth should not be permitted to
wrap themselves in the U. S. Constitution. The Constitution does not compel
us to sit by idly while the morals, safety, and the very Constitution itself is
threatened by a real and substantial evil. The Constitution permits us, and
morality compels us to eradicate these substantive evils before materialization.
JOSEPH M. KOLMACIC
Bibles, Wall of Separation and Rationality
On December 7, 1953, the Supreme Court of New Jersey added new height
to the "wall of separation between Church and State,"' when it decided the case
of Tudor v. Board of Education.2 Whether or not this action by the New Jersey
court, in the light of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution,3 judicial
precedents, and sound legal thinking, is a reasonable one, and whether or not
the effect of such action upon a desired policy of uninterrupted cooperation be-
tween Church and State may become a detrimental one, is the subject of this
writing.
In the Tudor Case, the Gideons International4 submitted an offer to furnish
bibles to New Jersey public school students free upon request. The offer extended
to students from 5th grade through high school and the Board of Education of
Rutherford County was to be the medium for such distribution. The Board
drew up a request form to be signed by the parents. The Board also requested
that: (1) only the names of pupils whose parents had previously signed for the
bibles should be used in any announcement; (2) pupils whose parents had signed
for bibles were to report to the home room at the close of the session and no
other pupils were to be in the room when the bibles were distributed; and (3)
'In the words of Jefferson, the clause in the First Amendment, against establishment
of religion by law, was intended to erect a "wall of separation between Church and
State." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 164 (1878). This metaphor has been freely
thrust about the courts and secularistic circles since its first utterance. Evidence of its use
as a ruling principle can be found in such a noted case as Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U. S. 1 (1947), where the Court said: "The Constitution requires, not comprehensive
identification of State with religion, but complete separation." However, recognition is
warranted in the following observation by the learned Mr. Justice Cardozo: "A fertile source
of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny of labels." Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U. S. 87 (1934)
2 14 N. J. 31, 100 A. 2d. 857 (1953).
8 U. S. CONsT. FIRST AMEND. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
4Gideons International-a religious sect founded in 1898 in Boscobel, Wisconsin.
Formerly known as the Christian Commercial Men's Association of America, its purpose
is to place copies of the bibles in hotels and institutions.
